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ABSTRACT 
The economics literature contains no consistent, generally 
accepted definition of regulation. Some standard references define 
regulation as the control of prices, profits and entry in the 
utility sector, while others include in the definition literally 
every public policy that alters market outcomes, including tariffs, 
commodity-specific taxes, and import quotas. This paper argues that 
definitions should have a basis in theory, and that regulatory 
research suggests three levels of generality of public policy that 
correspond to coherent theoretical analysis: the previous two, plus 
an intermediate level that covers the use of administrative processes 
to control private market interactions. Regulation is argued to be 
most appropriately applied to this intermediate level, and examples 
are given to justify the usefulness of the proposed classification 
scheme. 
WHAT IS REGULATION? 
Notes on the Ontology of Regulatory Policy 
Roger G. Noll 
In the good old days when economists focused attention 
almost exclusively on market behavior, the typical publication in 
the economics of regulation did not have to worry about defining terms. 
The topic of a paper was usually the effects of a particular form of 
regulatory policy (e.g. price regulation of utilities or spectrum 
allocation in broadcasting). All that such a study normally needed 
was a clear definition of the salient features of the policy that was 
the object of the study. These policies were normally regarded as 
exogenously determined; the issue at hand was to use microeconomic 
analysis to see how a firm constrained by these policies could be 
expected to behave in its market activities. 
This kind of research does not really need a clear definition 
of a term like "regulation" other than as a vehicle for advertising 
courses and textbooks. Generic aggregations of different policies 
need not be precisely defined when the focus of research is a 
particular detail, or a component of the aggregate. Whether commodity­
specific tariffs are taxes, regulations, or trade barriers in the minds 
of economists will affect the content of courses and textbooks, but 
not research. 
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My claim is that the need for more precision arose when 
economists began to regard policy instruments as endogenous. Three 
related questions have arisen in both the scholarly literature and 
the policy debate over regulatory reform during the decade of the 
1970s: why does Congress pass regulatory laws, what are the 
consequences of different institutional approaches to the same policy 
objective, and why do regulatory agencies structure their decision­
making processes as they do? In the 1930s political scientists began 
to suggest that regulation was a form of special-interest legislation 
that actually helped the people who were regulated. In the 1970s, 
more elaborate but generally similar theoretical statements appeared 
in the economics literature. 
At this level of analysis, the research questions become 
generic. In order to explain why regulation might be selected over 
another policy (including doing nothing other than to allow the 
continuing development of case law as it applies to a particular 
industry or market problem), the policy option "regulation" has to be 
well-defined, as do its alternatives. Similarly, in order to answer 
questions relating to the selection of policy options by a regulatory 
agency (including options about structure and procedures), one has to 
know what the agency is free to do as a regulatory agency--that is, 
one needs an accurate legal definition of regulat ion as it pertains 
to that particular agency. 
To illustrate the point, I shall cite some passages of a 
paper by Alain Enthoven and me. The problem was to try to convince 
some noneconomists that there were better ways for dealing with the 
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problem of rapidly rising expenditures on medical care than to impose 
more layers of regulation on the health sector. In order to make the 
point, the institutional choices had to be made clear: 
To date, three generic types of policy responses to the problem 
of rising health expenditures have been proposed. One is to 
increase greatly the share of medical costs that is paid by the 
patient so that consumers will have much more incentive to 
economize on medical services. A second is to leave intact the 
incentives for increasing expenditures in the fee-for-service, 
cost reimbursement, third-party intermediary system, but to 
impose economic and technical regulation on providers in an 
attempt to prevent the incentives from producing their natural 
effect. The third is to restructure the delivery and payments 
system in a manner that alters the basic financial incentives 
facing providers so that they find it in their interest to 
provide good quality but cost-effective care. The main thesis 
of this paper is that spending on health services cannot be 
effectively controlled in the present political context without 
the use of a policy of the third type.-
1 
_
/
Alain Enthoven and Roger Noll, "Regulatory and Nonregulatory Strategies 
for Controlling Health Care Costs, " in Stuart H. Altman and Robert 
Blendon, eds., Medic�l Technology: The Culprit Behind Health Care Costs? 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, publication (PHS) 79-
3216, 1979, p. 215. 
against risk. The aim: maximum public control with minimum 
public resources.-
1 
_
/
Wilcox and Shepherd, p. 331. 
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Wilcox and Shepherd implicitly, and Kahn explicitly, exclude all public 
policies other than standard economic regulation from their attention. 
In the age of EPA and OSHA, this exclusion seems bizarre; however, 
even in 1970, when Kahn's book was published, the Food and Drug 
Administration was an important, mature regulatory agency, and the 
Atomic Energy Commission had been regulating nuclear safety and 
licensing nuclear power facilities for sixteen years. In Kahn's two 
volumes, FDA .is mentioned once in a footnote, and the AEC is not 
mentioned at all. Wilcox and Shepherd have brief sections about both, 
but neither are called regulatory agencies. The FDA is in a section 
entitled "Promotion and Subsidies," and is cited as an example of 
policies to promote consumer interests, while the AEC is discussed as 
an example of public enterprise because of its dealings in the uranium 
market. Both books have extensive sections on television regulation 
(and both call the process regulation), yet neither discusses 
explicitly how the original definitions appear to exclude this policy 
from the regulation category. 
Kahn does state more precisely the focus of his inquiry: 
what he terms "economic regulation," which in turn ·is defined as 
control of either prices or entry. According to Kahn, "The government 
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regulates many industries that are not really public utilities. 
Conversely, even among the 'public utility' industries or at least at 
their periphery the regulation is often incomplete--control over price 
but not entry (for example, in insurance), over entry but not price 
(for example, in radio and television), or quality of service (for 
example, in banking), and so on."-
/ 
It is left as an exercise for 
I- Kahn, p. 13 
the interested reader why this excludes the FDA or AEC, or even tort 
law, from the definition, and how the above is to be squared with the 
earlier definition. 
Kahn struggles for the first fifteen pages of his text with 
what amount to definitional issues because he seeks generality. "This 
book springs from a conviction that valid scientific generalizations 
can be drawn and useful general guides to regulatory policies can be 
developed. Their intelligent application in particular situations, 
like the decision to regulate in the first place, can only be done on 
the basis of full consideration of the special characteristics of the 
industry in question • • • •  But the job is likely to be very badly 
done if it is not informed by a clear grasp of the common economic 
principles and considerations."-
/ 
I - Kahn, pp. 13-14. 
Approximately at the same time as Kahn's book was published, 
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For the choice among these alternatives to be clear, each has to be 
well defined, including the phrase "economic and technical regulation." 
REGULATION IN THE LITERATURE 
Despite the value of clarity in definition when the nature 
of the policy intervention is endogenous, the literature is relatively 
barren of attention to definitional issues. Most papers do not address 
the issue. When the issue is addressed, the standard approach is 
usually that of the widely used undergraduate text by Clair Wilcox 
and W. G. Shepherd: "Regulation is what regulators do."-
/ 
Moreover, 
_
/
Clair Wilcox and W. G. Shepherd, Public Policies Towards Business, 
5th ed. (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin & Co. , 1975), p. 331. 
what they are said to do is typically to regulate utilities, as these 
passages from the two leading texts make clear. 
There are at least two large chunks of the economy that the 
competitive market model obviously does not describe or even 
purport to describe. These are the huge and growing public 
sector . • .  and the public utilities, in which • . •  the 
central economic decisions are subject to direct governmental 
regulation. 
There are four principal components of this regulation that in 
combination distinguish the public utility from other sectors of 
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the economy: control of entry, price fixing, prescription of 
quality and conditions of service, and the imposition of an 
obligation to serve all applicants under reasonable conditions.-
/ 
_
/
Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, Vol. I, pp. 2-3. 
To "regulate" has at least three definitions. One is the tough 
and unilateral: "to govern or direct according to rule. " Another 
refers to compromise and smoothing over: "to reduce to order . .  
to regularize. " And another is superficial, perhaps empty: "to 
make regulations. " 
The classic, optimistic image of regulation fits the first 
definition, as follows. A utility sector is an natural monopoly, 
and so its firms are given franchises as exclusive suppliers to 
their areas and put under a regulatory commission. This Commission 
has full information on the utility and great skill in analyzing 
it. The Commission sets "fair" ceilings on the utility's prices 
and profit rates, and ensures that the utility price structure 
is "just and reasonable. " The utility must supply all customers 
at those constrained prices. The Commission monitors service 
quality and, if necessary, prevents the utility from being 
inefficient. 
Regulation therefore aspires to ratify monopoly where--and 
only where--it is necessary in the public interest, to prevent 
exploitation by the producer while reaping economies of scale, 
and yet to avoid using public capital, subsidies, or guarantees 
James McKie published a paper that could not be a better example of 
the type of generalization that Kahn was seeking. It develops what 
amounts to a functional definition of regulation as is the case in 
the two texts that are cited, but even though McKie was primarily 
concerned with public utilities, he managed a functional definition 
tha t cuts a broader swath. The opening pages of McKie's essay, one 
of my favorite statements in the literature on regulation, strike me 
as the most complete, well-conceived version of the idea that 
"regulation is what regulators do. " Here are a few excerpts. 
The number of economic variables and policies that a business 
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enterprise must determine somehow in running its internal affairs 
and i ts relationships with the outside world is formidable enough 
to discourage those who would attempt to control them all in 
order to make the enterprise conform to a predetermined plan. 
The following is only a summary list. 
The price structure--minimum prices, maximum prices, the 
degree of discrimination 
Non-price aspects and marketing methods 
Competitive tactics 
Efficiency of productipn; minimization of costs 
Quality of service, in several dimensions 
The rate of return 
Investment and extension of service by type and area 
Financial management 
Innovation and choice of techniques 
Purchasing policy 
Employee relations--composition of the labor force, 
productivity, wages and other terms of employment, 
collective bargaining 
Structural organization, acquisitions, integration, 
affiliation. 
Control over these variables by the management of the 
enterprise itself is never complete, even with full access to 
information and complete internal authority. An outside agency 
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like a public utility commission faces a far more difficult task--
or would if it tried to control the organism completely. But a 
commission does not try to control it completely. Ideally, it 
tries to make the enterprise conform to a few simple performance 
criteria, leaving other matters to the discretion of its 
management. 
No doubt the regulators ' task would be simpler if there 
were an isolated mechanical correspondence between certain of the 
above-mentioned elements of business policy and the dimension of 
performance that the regulators wish to affect. If their primary 
purpose were to prevent excessive returns in a protected monopoly 
situation, a simple limit on rate of return would then be enough. 
Some complications arise because regulatory authorities actually 
apply a variety of welfare criteria, which do not always reconcile 
with each other. But the main source of complications is, of 
course, the interconnections among the decision variables 
themselves. 
Any regulatory commission that tries to control these effects 
by regulating additional variables such as cost performance, 
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executive salaries and perquisites, choice of technical methods 
and rates of innovation, will quickly find its hopes to economize 
the means of regulation evapo�ating. As it extends further into 
the network of enterprise decisions it may discover that still 
other compensatory changes partly frustrate its efforts, and 
there are always more just over the horizon. Extension of 
control in response to perpetually escaping effects of earlier 
regulation may be called the " tar-baby effect, " since it usually 
enmeshes the regulatory authority in a control effort of 
increasing complexity with little gain in efficiency but a 
growing feeling of frustration. -
/ 
-
1
James W. McKie, " Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of 
Boundaries, " Bell Journal 1, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 7-9. 
As a definition, this states that regulation is an attempt 
to alter some of the performance criteria of a firm by controlling 
some of the specific decision variables that a rational firm, in the 
absence of regulation, would attempt to control. Moreover, it states 
that because of linkages among the decision and performance variables, 
some aspects of firm behavior may be altered even though they are not 
directly related to the purposes of regulation. Indeed, McKie 
believes that regulation is inevitably an ever-expanding morass of 
rules and controls because of the underlying problems associated 
with attempting to influence performance indirectly. 
The difficulty with McKie's functional definition is that, 
like the regulatory tar-baby effect, one seems to get in too deeply. 
This is exemplified by George Stigler's conception of regulation as 
stated in his roughly contemporaneous, highly influential article. 
Even more than Kahn envisioned or McKie addressed, Stigler seeks 
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truly cosmic generalization--why does regulation happen at all? In 
following the functional tradition of the economics literature to 
its logical end, the approach is, in my opinion, mortally wounded by 
the reducto ad absurdum in the opening passages of the article. 
A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily 
for its benefit. There are regulations whose net effects upon 
the regulated industry are undeniably onerous; a simple example 
is the differentially heavy taxation of the industry's product 
(whiskey, playing cards). These onerous regulations, however, 
are exceptional and can be explained by the same theory that 
explains beneficial (we may call it " acquired" ) regulation. 
The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not 
shared with even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to 
coerce. The state can seize money by the only method which is 
permitted by the laws of a civilized society, by taxation. The 
state can ordain the physical movements of resources and the 
economic decisions of households and firms without their consent. 
These powers provide the possibilities for the utilization of 
the state by an industry to increase its profitability. The 
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main policies which an industry (or occupation) may seek of the 
state are four. 
The most obvious contribution that a group may seek of the 
government is a direct subsidy of money. 
The second major public resource commonly sought by an 
industry is control over entry by new rivals. 
A third general set of powers of the state which will be 
sought by the industry are those which affect substitutes and 
complements. Crudely put, the butter producers wish to suppress 
margarine and encourage the production of bread. The airline 
industry actively supports the federal subsidies to airports; 
the building trade unions have opposed labor-saving materials 
through building codes. 
The fourth class of public policies sought by an industry 
is directed to price-fixing.-
/ 
-
1
George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal 
2, no. 1 (Spring 1971):3-6. 
To Stigler, virtually every public policy affecting business 
is regulation. The full text of the preceding passage mentions the 
whiskey tax, oil import quotas, tariffs, as well as the more prosaic 
policies of setting prices and controlling entry. Richard Posner 
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has stated that even the laws governing marriage, divorce and sexual 
behavior probably should be regarded as "regulation" according to this 
definition. All that Stigler excludes is the first category of public 
policies, direct cash subsidies, but this should probably have been 
included, too. If entry is controlled and income effects are ignored, 
application of the Cease Theorem produces an identity between taxes and 
subsidies for achieving regulatory ends (such as in environmental 
policy). Moreover, for every subsidy there is some corresponding 
coercive tax to finance it. Thus, if taxes are to be admitted to the 
regulatory domain, it seems logical to include subsidies as well. 
Otherwise, a purely functional definition of regulation must be abandoned 
in favor of an arbitrary one that has the following form: Regulation 
is all coercive acts of government designed to affect private decisions 
except the taxes collected and expenditures made for the purpose of 
bribing firms to alter their economic or political behavior. 
Indeed, an even more fundamentally arbitrary distinction 
arises in the functionalist approach. In some instances regulatory 
authorities award damages if a licensee imposes some harm on a customer 
of the regulated firm. An example is the payment to airline passengers 
if they are "bumped" from an overbooked flight. Similarly, tort and 
contract law contains numerous rules, developed through legal precedent, 
that accomplish the same type of ends. Are the latter regulations? 
Moreover, legislators often pass specific laws to undo some development 
in tort law or to put an end to an uncertainty concerning liability 
in some particular area. An example is the Price-Anderson Act. 
limiting the liability of owners of nuclear power plants in case of an 
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accident. Here the interplay between case law and legislative law 
is so complex that clear boundaries cannot be drawn between them. 
Logic compels the conclusion that o� a purely functional basis there 
is really no difference between the two, and that regulation should 
include tort and contract law. Not even an appeal to legislative 
action can save the distinction: legislators have not elected to 
overturn most case law--is this not implied legislative approval? -­
and, in any case, independent regulatory authorities develop case 
law in much the same fashion as the courts and without explicit 
legislative review. 
Stigler's insight is basically correct. If regulation 
is regarded as any policy that alters market outcomes by exercising 
some coercive power of government, almost nothing is excluded. The 
preceding nit-picks aside, Stigler's logic in including things like 
the whiskey tax, tariffs, and oil import quotas in a functional 
definition of regulation is unassailable. 
AN INTERMEDIATE VIEW 
Probably most economists, and certainly most lawyers, 
political scientists, government officials, and businessmen would be 
quite uncomfortable to stop the inquiry at this point and give up on 
any more specific definition of regulation. Is it true that no useful 
levels of generality stand between specific regulatory policies (e. g. 
price regulation of utilities) and literally every microeconomic 
policy instrument employed by government? Obviously not. Stigler 
lists some specific instruments: tariffs, taxes, entry controls, 
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price controls, and building codes. Presumably environmental controls, 
safety and health standards, and other forms of so-called social 
regulation are subsumed under his "economic regulation" title, for 
they are related closely to things that are mentioned. 
This type of categorization based upon the type of policy 
instrument used would probably not satisfy noneconomists. It still 
overlooks a central feature of regulation that seems essential: 
regulation is not just what regulators do, it is also how they do it . 
To a lawyer, the study of regulation is the study of a branch of 
administrative law. In turn, administrative law is rooted in 
Constitutional principles that place important constraints on how 
certain kinds of policies are implemented. 
The key issue that is overlooked in most of the literature 
on the economics of regulation is the role of administrative law in 
the process. If the legislature is to set up an agency to oversee 
the operation of a particular industry or to affect a particular 
performance criterion of industries generally, the regulatory rules 
it issues must be made by application of an information-gathering 
and decisionmaking process that satisfies legal principles of due 
process. These requirements are stricter for decisions by agencies 
than for acts of Congress, yet less strict than most court procedures. 
Hence, the selection of a regulatory policy to be implemented through 
a regulatory agency is a selection of procedures and standards of 
decisionmaking that differ from the procedures and standards applied 
to other kinds of government actions. 
The preceding suggests a definition of regulation that 
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combines the functional with the procedural. The following summarizes 
the essence of such a definition. 
As used here, regulation refers to a type of social control of 
transactions that is characterized by its procedures as well 
as by the substantive purpose of the regulation. The two key 
characteristics of regulation are as follows. First, the 
regulatory authority is not a party to the transactions it 
regulates. Instead, it acts as the referee of transactions 
between other parties. By contrast, eligibility requirements 
and cost reimbursement formulas for Medicare or Medicaid 
recipients are not, in this sense, regulations because they are 
written by the purchaser of the service. These controls are 
more properly regarded as terms of a contract between a 
purchaser and a vendor. While these controls are likely to be 
subject to the same kinds of political and legal problems that 
plague regulation, their development and promulgation is by an 
agency with a direct budgetary stake in the outcome. Consequently, 
the agency is directly accountable for the financial implications 
of its decisions, whereas a regulatory agency is not. Second, 
regulation is operated according to procedural rules that were 
developed from case law and formalized after the fact in the 
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. The most important 
features of these rules are that decisions must be based on 
evidence that is presented in formal proceedings, that substantial 
evidence must be submitted in support of each decision, and that 
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the courts may review a decision if it is appealed by a 
participant in the regulatory proceeding. By contrast, conditions 
on government purchases and subsidies do not have such elaborate 
procedural requirements.-
/ 
I- Enthoven and Noll, p. 217. 
The two-dimensional definition of regulation is an intermediate 
level of generalization that produces a coherent separation of public 
policies. At some higher level of generality are all business policies, 
much as the list in Stigler's paper or the functional concept implicit 
in McKie's list of business decision variables that government might 
decide to try to control or constrain. At a lower level of generality 
are specific categories of regulatory agencies. At the same level of 
generality are business policies that have different procedural rules, 
such as decisions about support prices in agriculture, or pieces of 
legislation that state specific rules for business that, if propounded 
by an agency, would be "regulatory" because they would be subjected 
to procedural requirements (an example is the first stage of the 
fleet mileage fuel efficiency requirements on automobiles). 
APPLYING THE FUNCTIONAL-PROCEDURAL DEFINITION 
The key to the value of the definition of regulation based 
on both function and procedures is whether it is useful for analysis. 
I claim that two types of research questions apply to regulatory 
policies as so defined, which justifies making some distinction of--
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inventing a word for--this policy instrument and function compared to 
others. 
The first is that knowledge of regulatory procedures is 
valuable in predicting the outcome of regulatory processes. Once an 
agency is established, procedures may determine the nature of 
decisions, and before an agency is established, knowledge of procedures 
will be useful in predicting the differences in consequences between 
regulation and other policies. I cite three examples in this category. 
1. The response of utility regulation to inflation. Paul 
Joskow---
1 
has examined in detail the consequences on utility regulation 
-
1
Paul L. Joskow, "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural 
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of 
Law and Economics 17, no. 2 (October 1974):296-99. 
of the inflationary period that began in the late 1960s. The argument 
he presents is an example of how to use structural features of the 
regulatory process as an important element of a prediction about the 
performance of a regulated sector. Joskow's brilliant paper illustrates 
how explicit consideration of structural and procedural issues are 
used to generate testable hypotheses about regulatory outcomes. 
Recently the salient features of Joskow's ideas have been formalized, 
and the results in terms of the implications for utility behavior are 
quite striking compared to the previous theoretical literature built 
around the Averch-Johnson hypothesis.-
1 
Thus, Joskow's insights, 
-
1
H. Stuart Burness, W. David Montgomery, and James P. Quirk, "The 
Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power: A Case Study in Risk-Sharing Arrange-
19 
ments Involving Regulated Firms, " California Institute of Technology, 
Social Science Working Paper No. 175; forthcoming, American Economic 
Review. 
based on structures and procedures, have yielded important advances 
in understanding utility performance. 
2. The effects of hospital regulation. My concern about 
the continuing expansion of regulation in the hospital sector as a 
means of dealing with rising hospital expenditures has already been 
mentioned. The definition of regulation that was proposed in that 
paper was then used to argue that the hospital industry is especially 
unsuited for traditional regulation, whether economic or technical, 
because of the number and heterogeneity of firms in the industry and 
of the products, and because of the fuzzy nature of performance 
measures.-
/ 
The explanation offered therein for the ineffectiveness 
-
1
Enthoven and Noll, pp. 217-20. 
of regulation as a means for dealing with rising medical care costs 
does not depend on a "capture" argument, and indeed goes beyond it. 
Hospitals for the most part perceive effective entry controls as in 
their interests. They also want to make regulation work to control 
costs by preventing service competition that erodes the gains of 
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rising prices. Medical care providers generally want to preserve the 
third-party, fee-for-service system, and they want to use regulation 
to control costs so that the present system will not be dismantled 
by the political system, which is growing ever more weary of footing 
the bill. 
Certificate of need regulation is already working well to 
prevent the entry of new hospitals; more regulation is not necessary 
to optimize the position of incumbent hospitals. But hospitals 
realize that the political price for certificate of need--that it 
control costs--is not being paid because hospitals have far more options 
than capacity expansion as mechanisms for nonprice competition. More 
extensive regulation illustrates the tar-baby effect. And, for 
structural and procedural reasons, more regulation will not succeed 
in achieving the purposes hospitals hope that it will serve. 
3. The consequences of safety regulation. Certainly no one 
has yet seriously claimed that safety regulatory agencies, like the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) or the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA), are examples of industry cartelization. 
Indeed, OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) probably 
lead the business community's enemies list. Yet the structures cause 
some interesting examples of "capture" in particular cases, and in 
any case make the policy more costly than even its proponents prefer. 
Examples include the reliance of the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
on the "offeror" process, whereby the CPSC must let others write their 
standards if a competent party volunteers, and the generally anti-
competitive consequences of relying more on standards than information 
requirements or incentives.-
/ 
-
1
see Nina W. Cornell, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast, "Safety 
Regulation," in Owen and Schultze, Setting National Priorities: The 
Next Ten Years (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), 
esp. pp. 489-95. 
The three preceding examples illustrate the relationship 
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between structure and outcomes in regulation. The second useful 
aspect of the two-dimensional conceptualization of regulation is that 
it parallels some new theoretical developments about the reasons for 
the formation of regulatory agencies. In his recent revision of his 
classic treatise on American government, Theodore Lowi has reinterpretted 
his ideas in terms of a new overriding principle of government--that one 
of its primary functions is to protect people from uncertainty.-
/ 
As 
_
/
Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of 
the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1969). 
Lowi was writing his revision, Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam were 
constructing a theory of regulation based on essentially this premise. 
In the Owen-Braeutigam world, the purpose of regulation is, in part, 
to slow change and make it less abrupt. Voters are willing to pay 
some price in terms of market inefficiency and excess producer profits 
in order to buy this stability. 
The two major conclusions can be briefly summarized. First, a 
major effect of the administrative or regulatory process is to 
attenuate the rate at whi9h market and technological forces 
impose changes on individual economic agents; it is rational 
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for voters to prefer such a mechanism for avoiding risk to a 
laissez-faire market system, even at the cost of some efficiency 
loss. The administrative process is "fairer" than the ungoverned 
market because it imposes due process requirements on any change 
in the existing set of goods, prices, and market structures. 
The result is to give individuals and firms some legal rights to 
the status quo. The second point is that regulated firms and 
industries operate within the administrative process just as they 
operate in the market; the environment provides opportunities for 
strategic behavior in pursuit of economic objectives. 
The idea put forward here is simple. The courts and Congress 
have collaborated in constructing a law of administrative 
procedure that has certain economic implications. Congress has 
simultaneously expanded the range of economic decisions that are 
subjected to the forms of this process. We should therefore be 
willing to accept the implication that Congress (and voters) 
intend this result. Examining the nature of the result gives 
insight into the objectives sought. The objective is economic 
justice or fairness. This is quite explicit; this is what law 
is all about. There are two features of the administrative 
process that are of interest. The first is delay. The second 
is derivative: the grant to individuals and their interest 
groups of equity rights in the status quo. 
23 
Legislators and successive democratically elected administrations, 
reacting to the preferences of voters, or median voters, have 
been steadily replacing markets with courts. We can reject the 
notion that this is done because markets are inefficient compared 
to fiat allocation. The regulatory agencies are almost never 
told what sort of allocational criteria they are to use. 
Legislators, and therefore presumably median voters, are 
concerned that the process of resource allocation be fair, and 
are apparently prepared to accept the outcome so long as the 
procedure is fair. From this, it is possible to infer that 
people dislike the very process of free market allocation, no 
doubt because its outcome is regarded as risky and therefore 
unfair. Alternatively, we might say that voters prefer a system 
that provides some leverage when the market confronts them with 
an economic loss, particularly one that is unexpected. This is 
hardly inconsistent with producers' demands for cartel management, 
and it explains why the political system does not react favorably 
to the economist's calls for deregulation. 
Future research that is aimed at normative conclusions must 
consider, first, whether the administrative process does provide 
people with a means of avoiding risk in the market system, and 
second, whether it does so at acceptable cost or whether it is 
superior to alternative means of achieving economic security 
and justice. We do not know the answers to these questions. 
Nevertheless, we are reminded �f Edward Gibbon's comments on 
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the fall of Athenian democracy: "In the end they valued security 
more than they valued freedom, and they lost both.11-
1 
-
1
Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game: Strategic 
Use of the Administrative Process (Philadelphia: Ballinger, 1978), 
PP· 1-36. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the end, definitional issues are subsidiary to something 
more fundamental. Indeed, if taken too seriously, they can be 
diverting from the essential point behind the search for careful 
definitions. Obviously, the two-dimensional definition of regulation 
need not be accepted; we could all agree to call the same category 
something else. For example, we could borrow from the physicists and 
start naming things after our own, perhaps calling the global, 
functionalist definition a "stigler, " the procedural subcategory 
could be a "joskow, " and the dead-weight loss associated with the 
tax-transfer system of a joskow might be measured in posners. In any 
case, the point is that a joskow is a useful unit of analysis for 
theorizing and for guiding empirical studies of the effects of one 
particular type of stigler. Moreover, if scholars adopt consistent 
definitions, it will improve our ability to communicate with each 
other and with policymakers. One advantage of letting regulation 
be a joskow is that it comes closest to comporting with the notion 
of regulation that is held by others. 
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